Does politicizing ‘gender’ influence the possibility of conducting academic research? Evidence from a randomized controlled trial
Tünde Lénárd – Dániel Horn – Hubert János Kiss Economics Letters Vol. 189. 2020. Abstract: We detect a significant negative effect of mentioning ‘gender’ as a research topic on conducting academic research in Hungary. Using a randomized information treatment involving a comprehensive sample of Hungarian education providers we find that they are less willing to cooperate in a gender-related future research compared to […]
Does trust associate with political regime?
Since trust correlates with economic development and in turn economic development associates with political regime, we conjecture that there may be a relationship between trust and political regime. We investigate if trust aggregated on the country level correlates with the political regime. We do not find any significant association, with or without taking into account […]
Patient democracies?
We test if the political regime of a country associates with the patience of the citizens. Recent findings indicate that i) more democratic countries tend to have higher growth, and ii) patience correlates positively with economic development, suggesting a potential link between the political regime and patience. We document a positive association between the level […]
On the welfare effects of differential pricing
The paper discusses the economic aspects of the most important questions (such as demand response or capacity allocation) related to differential pricing. First, we consider a revenue-neutral introduction of peak-load pricing. We examine under what circumstances does peak-load pricing lead to a Pareto improvement compared to uniform pricing. Second, we analyze what properties of customers […]
Do individuals with children value the future more?
In recent years public and political debate suggested that individuals with chil- dren value the future more. We attempt to substantiate the debate and using a representative survey we investigate if the number of children (or simply having children) indeed is associated with a higher valuation of the future that we proxy with an aspect […]
Apportionment and Districting by Sum of Ranking Differences
Sum of Ranking Differences is an innovative statistical method that ranks competing solutions based on a reference point. The latter might arise naturally, or can be aggregated from the data. We provide two case studies to feature both possibilities. Apportionment and districting are two critical issues that emerge in relation to democratic elections. Theoreticians invented […]
Trading Networks with Frictions
We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative stability property called trail stabity. […]
The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of agents, who mutually prefer each other to their […]
Pairwise preferences in the stable marriage problem
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to declare a draw or even withdraw from such a comparison. This freedom is then gradually restricted as […]
Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is “globally stable” or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching M’: […]
Popular Matchings in Complete Graphs
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is “globally stable” or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching M’: […]
Understanding popular matchings via stable matchings
An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G together with, for each vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G is popular in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching […]
