Trading Networks with Frictions
We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative stability property called trail stabity. […]
The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of agents, who mutually prefer each other to their […]
Pairwise preferences in the stable marriage problem
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to declare a draw or even withdraw from such a comparison. This freedom is then gradually restricted as […]
Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is “globally stable” or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching M’: […]
Popular Matchings in Complete Graphs
Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is “globally stable” or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching M’: […]
Understanding popular matchings via stable matchings
An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G together with, for each vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G is popular in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching […]
Does political pressure on ‘gender’ engender danger for scientific research? Evidence from a randomized controlled trial
We detect a significant negative effect of mentioning ‘gender’ as a research topic on conducting academic research in Hungary. Using a randomized information treatment involving a comprehensive sample of Hungarian education providers we find that they are less willing to cooperate in a gender related future research compared to a research without this specification. Our […]
On the Shapley value of liability games
In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such liability problems. We establish three main monotonicity […]
The gender pay gap in Hungary: new results with a new methodology
MT-DP – 2019/24 Olga Takács – János Vincze The gender pay gap in Hungary: new results with a new methodology
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with recursive tree-based methods: a technical note
MT-DP – 2019/23 Olga Takács – János Vincze Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with recursive tree-based methods: a technical note
Measurement of innovation: the use and misuse of indicators and scoreboards
MT-DP – 2019/21 Havas Attila Measurement of innovation: the use and misuse of indicators and scoreboards The choice of indicators to measure innovation processes and assess performance is of vital significance. This paper argues that those economic theories give a more accurate, more reliable account of innovation activities that follow a broad approach of innovation, […]
Convergence, productivity and debt: the case of Hungary
MT-DP – 2019/16 Dániel Baksa – István Kónya Convergence, productivity and debt: the case of Hungary
