This paper compares the evolution of CE4 countries’ (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) national innovation systems, as well as their innovation performance. Its analytical framework draws on evolutionary (and institutional) economics of innovation.

Given the structural features and the level of socio-economic development in the CE4 countries, as well as the dominant way of thinking since the cold war, Western politicians, business people, analysts and journalists tend to share a ‘block’ view of these countries. Further, there is a noticeable – and certainly understandable – ‘drive’ also from the academic community to produce findings that can be generalised across the new EU member states, but at least for the CE4 countries, that is, to focus on identifying shared or similar features. Yet a closer look at the structure of the national innovation systems in these countries, as well as at their innovation performance, points to a different direction. While the structural composition of the research sub-systems of the CE4 countries showed a great diversity already in 2000, fairly significant changes have occurred since then almost in all countries, adding more colours to the observed diversity. Neither a similar structural composition of the research sub-system can be observed, nor a move towards a similar structure. Their innovation performance is also diverse.

Given the diversity among innovation systems, one should be very careful when trying to draw policy lessons from the ‘rank’ of a country as ‘measured’ by a composite indicator. The CE4 countries, therefore, need to avoid the trap of paying too much attention to simplifying ranking exercises. Instead, it is of utmost importance to conduct detailed, thorough comparative analyses, identifying the reasons for a reasonable or disappointing performance.

Policy-makers – working on various domains, notably regulations, home affairs, security, science, technology, and innovation (STI) policies – need to pay close attention to possible new ways and methods for the interpenetration of criminal and lawful economic activities. This paper is aimed at assisting these policy-makers by presenting four possible futures (scenarios) on the interpenetration of criminal and lawful economic activities and considering their implications.

These scenarios assume that the interpenetration of criminal and lawful economic activities – just as most other types of crime – cannot be fully eradicated. There are two competing groups of actors whose capacities, activities, and efficiency largely determine the possibilities for, and repercussions of, the interpenetration of criminal and lawful economic activities: criminal actors and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The scenarios, therefore, are shaped by two main dimensions: i) whether LEAs are well-resourced, strong, and effective or not, and ii) whether large criminal organisations or small-scale ones are the dominant criminal actors. Hence, the four scenarios consider various types of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that influence actors to commit – or not – criminal economic activities; the main types of these activities; features of regulations; research, technological development, and innovation activities by the criminal actors vs LEAs; as well as the activities, capabilities, and resources of LEAs.

By considering the nature of the criminal activities that aim at penetrating lawful economic activities, and the options to prevent, monitor, and fight these crimes, the report explores a range of policy implications, especially for STI policies and regulations. Further, it stresses the multi-level nature of policy-making in the EU, as well as the need for collaboration with the willing countries outside the EU. Criminal actors can penetrate lawful economic activities in the EU when commissioned by hostile (‘rogue’) states that aim to weaken and/or undermine the EU and its Member States as part of their geopolitical power games.

Does a drastic cut in in potential benefit duration affect the take-up of unemployment insurance benefits among those eligible? We evaluate a policy change reducing the maximum length of UI benefits from 9 to 3 months in Hungary at the end of 2011. We rely on rich longitudinal matched administrative data, which allows us to obtain information on a large sample of job losers, and precisely estimate eligibility for UI benefits. We find that slightly less than 60 percent of UI eligible individuals claim benefits, and that while the length of benefit entitlement is only slightly positively correlated with taking up benefits, UI claiming rate tends to increase with previous earnings. We show that the proportion of UI benefit claims fell only slightly (by 1.5 – 2 percentage points), but this effect was more pronounced for those with the largest potential losses in UI value. This moderate effect might be related to the fact that the reform essentially got rid of the period of flat-rate UI benefits, while keeping the period when UI benefits were proportional to previous earnings roughly unchanged.  At the same time, UI take-up decreased among those with low earnings (around the minimum wage) but stable employment, a group with likely little savings, which is alarming from a social policy perspective.

In this study, we investigate the correlation between corruption risk and the level of education in European sub-national regions (NUTS2 level) between 2006 and 2020 in 16 member countries. We use the data of Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) covering the parameters of 6,766,274 public procurement contracts in total and NUTS2 level Eurostat data. We found that higher educational attainment is associated with lower corruption risk and a higher level of control of corruption, indicating that better-educated locals may force authorities to limit corruption risk as they have less tolerance for corrupt behavior. In addition, the results point out that the increasing level of education is associated with a decreasing level of corruption risk. Our study contributes to corruption research by using objective indicators characterizing the NUTS2 regions of some European countries.

Ebben a tanulmányban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy a munkavállalók és a járások szintjén megfigyelt béregyenlőtlenségeknek mekkora hányadát magyarázzák a munkavállalói és munkáltatói jellemzők, illetve a térségek eltérő adottságai. Ehhez a Pénzügyminisztérium bértarifa-felvételét használjuk fel, ami részletes adatokkal szolgál a munkavállalók keresetéről, egyéni jellemzőiről, illetve a munkáltatókról. Eredményeink azt mutatják, hogy az egyének szintjén megfigyelt bérkülönbségek magyarázatában a munkavállalók jellemzői, ezen belül is főként a betöltött munkakör jellege, illetve az iskolai végzettség játssza a vezető szerepet. A munkáltatói szintű ismérvek magyarázóereje másodlagos, de még így is jelentősen meghaladja a térségi adottságok együttes hozzájárulását, ami legfeljebb 1-3%-ra tehető. A járási szintű átlagbér-különbségek vizsgálata során azt kapjuk, hogy a járások munkavállalói és munkáltatói összetétele a béregyenlőtlenségek háromnegyedéért felelős, az összetételhatás kiszűrésével a bruttó havi átlagbérek szórása harmadára csökken. Ezek az eredmények elsősorban a humán tőke fejlesztésére irányuló szakpolitikai beavatkozások szerepét húzzák alá a hátrányos helyzetű térségek jövedelmi felzárkóztatásában.